There is a generic way to add any new feature to a system. It involves 1) identifying the basic units which build up the system and 2) introducing the new feature to each of these basic units.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to provide some orientation to underpin probabilistic semantics for abstract argumentation. We feel that a properly developed probabilistic argumentation framework cannot be obtained by simply imposing an arbitrary probability distribution on the components of an argumentation system that does not agree with the dynamic aspects of these networks. We need to find a probability distribution that is compatible with their underlying motivation.
We shall use the methodology of "Logic by Translation", which works as follows: Given a new area for which we want to study certain aspect properties AP, we translate this area to classical logic, study AP in classical logic and then translate back and evaluate what we have obtained.
Let us start by looking at interpretations of an abstract argumentation network S, R , S = ∅, R ⊆ S × S, into logics which already have probabilistic versions. This way we can import the probability aspect from there and it will have a meaning. We begin with translating abstract argumentation frames into classical propositional logic. In the abstract form, the elements of S are just atoms waiting to be instantiated as arguments coming from another application system. R may be defined using the source application system or may represent additional constraints. At any rate, in this abstract form, S is just a set of atoms and all we have about it is R. In translating S, R into classical propositional logic, we view S as a set of atomic propositions and we use R to generate a classical theory ∆ S, R . Consider Figure 1 , which describes the basic attack formation of all the attackers Att(x) = {y ∈ S | (y, x) ∈ R} = {y 1 , . . . , y n } of the node x in a network S, R .
The essential logic translation of the attack on each node x is given by (E1) below, where x, y i are propositional symbols representing the elements x, y i ∈ S:
So S, R corresponds to a classical propositional theory ∆ S, R = {x ↔ i ¬y i | x ∈ S}. 1 Note that in classical logic, this theory may be inconsistent and have no models. For example, if S contains a single node x and R is 1 If there is a logical relationship between the arguments of S that can be captured by formulae, then we can alternatively instantiate x −→ ϕx, giving ∆ S, R = {ϕx ↔ i ¬ϕy | x, y ∈ S}.
{(x, x)}, i.e., the network has a single self-attacking node, then the associated theory is {x ↔ ¬x}, which has no model. For this reason it is convenient to regard these theories as theories of Kleene three-valued logic, with values in {0, 
x = 1 means that x = in (all attackers y i = out)
x = 1 2 means that x = und (no attacker y i = in and at least (3) one attacker y j = und)
The acceptability semantics above can be re-written in terms of the semantics of Kleene's logic as v(x) = min{1 − v(y i )} which in equational form can be simplified to
The reader should note that we actually solve the equations over the unit interval [0, 1] and project onto Kleene's 3-valued logic by letting x = 0 mean x = out (at least one attacker y i = in) 0 < x < 1 mean x = und (no attacker y i = in and at least one attacker y j = und) x = 1 mean x = in (all attackers y i = out)
Now there are probabilistic approaches to two-valued classical logic. The simplest two methods are described in Gabbay's book Logic for Artificial Intelligence and Information Technology [4] . Our idea is to bring the probabilistic approach through the above translation into argumentation theory. Let us start with a description of the probabilistic approaches to classical propositional logic.
Method 1: Syntactic. Impose probability P (q) on the atoms q of the language and propagate this probability to arbitrary well-formed formulas (wffs). So if ϕ(q 1 , . . . , q m ) is built up from the atoms q 1 , . . . , q m , we can calculate P (ϕ) if we know P (q i ), i = 1, . . . , m.
Method 2: Semantic. Impose probability on the models of the language of {q 1 , . . . , q m }. The totality of models is the space W of all {0, 1}-vectors in 2 m . We give values P (ε), for any ε ∈ 2 m , with the restriction that Σ ε∈2 m P (ε) = 1. The probability of any wff ϕ is then
The motivation for the syntactical Method 1 is that the atoms {q 1 , . . . , q m } are all independent. So for example, the date of birth of a person (p) is independent of whether it is going to rain heavily on that person's 21st birthday (q). However, if we want to hold a birthday party r in the garden on the 21st birthday, then we have that q attacks r.
If, on the other hand, we have: a = John comes to the party b = Mary comes to the party then a and b may be dependent, especially if some relationship exists between John and Mary. We may decide that the probability of a ∧ b is 0, but the probabilities of ¬a ∧ b and of a ∧ ¬b are 1 4 each and the probability of ¬a ∧ ¬b is 1 2 . Assigning probability in this way depends on the likelihood we attach to a particular situation (model). This is the semantic approach. Example 1.1 shows that these two methods are orthogonal.
Example 1.1 What can ∆ S, R mean in classical logic? It is a generalisation of the "Liar's paradox". x attacking itself is like x saying "I am lying": x = if and only if x = ⊥. Figure 1 represents y i saying x is a lie. ∆ S, R represents a system of lying accusations: a community liar paradox. Similarly, S can represent people possibly invited to a birthday party. y → x means y saying "if I come, x cannot come". So Figure 1 is saying "invite x if and only if you do not invite any of the y i ".
Suppose we instantiate x −→ ϕ x . Then we must have P (ϕ x ) = P ( i ¬ϕ yi ). However, there may be also a connection between ϕ x and some ϕ y k , e.g., ϕ x ϕ y k . This will impose further restrictions on P (ϕ x ) and P (ϕ y k ), and it may be the case that no such probability function exists.
Remark 1.2
The two approaches are of course, connected. If we are given a probability on each q i , then we get probability on each ε ∈ 2 m by letting
The q i 's are considered independent, so the probability of i ±q i is the product of the probabilities
where P (¬q i ) = 1 − P (q i ) and the probability of A ∨ B is
when ¬(A ∧ B), as is the case with disjuncts in a disjunctive normal form. So, for example
The syntactical approach (Method 1)
Let us investigate the use of the syntactical approach. Let S, R be an argumentation network. In the equational approach, according to the syntactical Method 1, we assign probabilities to all the atoms and are required to solve the equation (E3) below for each x, where Att(x) = {y i } and x and all y i are numbers in [0, 1]:
Since in Method 1, all atoms are independent, (E3) is equivalent to (E3*):
Such equations always have a solution. Let us check whether this makes sense. Let us try to identify the argument x equationally with its probability, namely we let P (x) = x.
If x = und, let 0 < P (x) < 1 to be determined by the solution to the equations. Equation (E3*) becomes, under P (x) = x, the following:
This is the Eq inv equation in the equational approach (see [5] ).
The following definition will be useful in the interpretation of values from [0, 1] and their counterparts in Caminada's labelling functions.
Definition 2.1 A valuation function f can be mapped into a labelling function λ(f ) as follows.
What do we know about Eq inv ? We quote the following from [5] .
Theorem 2.2 Let f be a solution to equations (E4). Then λ(f ) defined according to Definition 2.1 is a legal Caminada labelling (see [1] ) and leads to a complete extension.
Theorem 2.3 Let λ 0 be a legal Caminada labelling leading to a preferred extension. Then there exists a solution f 0 , such that λ 0 = λ(f 0 ).
a b
Figure 2: A sample argumentation network having a complete extension that cannot be found via Equations (E4).
Remark 2.4
There are (complete) extensions λ such that there does not exist an f with λ = λ(f ). For example, in Figure 2 , the extension a = b = und cannot be obtained by any f . Only b = in, a = out can be obtained as a solution to equations (E4).
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Example 2.5 Let S, R be given and let λ be a complete extension which is not preferred! The reason that λ is not preferred, is that we have by definition, a λ 1 extending λ, which gives more {in, out} values to points z, for which λ gives the value und. Therefore, we can prevent the existence of such an extension λ 1 , if we force such points z to be undecided. This we do by attacking such points z by a new self-attacking point u. The construction is therefore as follows. We are given S, R and a complete extension λ, which is not preferred. We now construct a new S , R which is dependent on λ. Consider S , R where S = S ∪ {u}, where u ∈ S, is a new point. Let R be
3 The equations are
From the above two equations we get
The only possibility is a = 0. Then λ = λ ∪ {(u, und)} is a preferred extension of S , R and can therefore be obtained from a function f using the equations (E4).
Let us see what the construction above does to our example in Figure 2 , and let us look at the extension λ(a) = λ(b) = und.
Consider the network in Figure 3 . Its equations (E4) are:
From (1) we get u = 1 2 . So we have:
therefore substituting in (1) we get
The extension of the network is a = b = und.
Summary of the results so far for the syntactical probabilistic method. Given an argumentation network S, R , we can find all Method 1 complete probabilistic extensions for it by solving all Eq inv equations. Such complete probabilistic extensions will also be complete extensions in the traditional sense (i.e., Dung's), which will also include all preferred extensions (Theorems 2.2 and 2.3). 4 However, not all complete extensions can be obtained in this manner (i.e., by Method 1, see remark 2.4 and compare with Example 3.6).
We can, nevertheless, for any complete extension E which cannot be obtained by Method 1, obtain it from the solutions of the equations generated for a larger network S , R as shown in Example 2.5.
We shall say more about this in a later section.
Remark 2.6 Evaluation of the results so far for the syntactical probabilistic method.
1. We discovered a formal mathematical connection between the syntactical probabilistic approach (Method 1) and the Equational Eq inv approach. Is this just a formal similarity or is there also a conceptual connection?
The traditional view of an abstract argumentation frame S, R , is that the arguments are abstract, some of them abstractly attack each other. We do not know the reason, but we seek complete extensions of arguments that can co-exist (i.e., being attack-free), and that protect themselves. The equational approach is an equational way of finding such extensions. Each solution f to the equations give rise to a complete extension. The numbers we get from such solutions f of the equational approach can be interpreted as giving the degree of being in the complete extension (associated with f) or being out of it.
Due to the mathematical similarity with the probability approach, these numbers are now interpreted as probabilities.
To what extent is this justified? Can we do this at all?
Let us recall the syntactical probabilistic method. We start with an abstract argumentation framework S, R and add the probability P (x) for each x ∈ S. We can interpret P (x) as the probability that x "is a player" to be considered (this is a vague statement which could mean anything but is sufficient for our purpose). The problem is how do we take into account the attack relation? Our choice was to require equation (E3). It is this 4 Note that in traditional Dung semantics a preferred extension E is maximal in the sense that there is no extension E such that 1. If x is considered in (resp. out) by E then x is also considered in (resp. out) by E .
2. There exists at least one node considered in (resp. out) by E and considered und by E.
The above definition holds for numerical or probabilistic semantics, where the value 1 (resp. 0) is understood as in (resp. out) and values in (0, 1) are understood as und.
choice that allowed the connection between the syntactical probabilistic approach and the Equational approach with Eq inv .
So our syntactical probabilistic approach should work as follows.
Let P be the independent probability on each x ∈ S. This is an arbitrary number in [0, 1]. Such a P cannot be used for calculating extensions because it does not take into consideration the attack relation R. So modify P to a P which does respect R via Equation (E3).
How do we modify P to find P ?
Well, we can use a numerical iteration method. The details are not important here, the importance is in the idea, which can be applied to the traditional notion of extensions as well. Given S, R and an arbitrary desired assignment E of elements that are in (and consequently also determining elements that are out) for S, this E may not be legitimate in taking into account R, so we need to modify it to get the best proper extension E nearest to E (cf. [2, 6] ).
So our syntactical probabilistic approach yielding a P satisfying Equation (E3) can be interpreted as Eq inv extensions obtained from initial values which are probabilities (as opposed to, say, initial values being a result of voting) corrected via iteration procedures using R.
Alternatively, we can look at the Eq inv equations as a mathematical means of finding all those syntactical probabilities P which respect the attack relation R (via Equation (E3)).
Or we can see the solutions of the Eq inv as giving probabilities for being included or excluded in the complete extension defined by these solutions (as opposed to the interpretation of the degree of being in or out).
2. The discussion in item 1. above hinged upon the choice we made to take account of R by respecting Equation (E3). There are other alternatives for taking R into account. We can give direct, well-motivated definitions of how to propagate probabilities along attack arrows. This is similar to the well-known problem of how to propagate probabilities along proofs (provability support arrows, or modus ponens, etc). Such an analysis is required anyway for instantiated networks, for example in ASPIC+ style [10] ). We shall deal with this in a subsequent paper.
The semantical approach (Method 2)
Let us now check what can be obtained if we use Method 2, i.e., giving probability to the models of the language. In this case the equation (for {y i } = Att(x)) (E3) P (x) = P ( i ¬y i ) still holds, but the ¬y i are not independent. So we cannot write equation (E3*) for them and get Eq inv . Instead we need to use the schema P (A ∨ B) = P (A) + P (B) − P (A ∧ B). We begin with a key lemma, which will enable us to compare later with the work of M. Thimm, see [13] .
Lemma 3.1 Let S, R be a network and let P be a probability measure on the space W of all models of the language whose set of atoms is S. For x ∈ S, let the following hold
where Att(x) = {y 1 , . . . , y n }.
Then we have
Proof. By induction on n.
1. If x = ¬y then P (x) = 1 − P (y) and the above holds.
2. Assume the above holds for m, show for m+1.
We have by the induction hypothesis
Consider now:
On the other hand, by our assumption
The converse of Lemma 3.1 does not hold, as we shall see in Example 3.5 below. Let us look at some examples illustrating the use of Method 2.
Example 3.3 Consider the network in Figure 4 . This figure is taken from Thimm's "A probabilistic semantics for abstract argumentation" [13, Figure  1 ]. We include it here for two reasons:
1. To illustrate or probabilistic semantic approach.
2. To use it later to compare our work with Thimm's approach.
Let us apply Method 2 to it and assign probabilities to the models of the propositional language with the atoms {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 }. We assign P as follows.
Let us compute P (a i ), for i = 1, . . . , 5.
We have
We get P (a 1 ) = 0.3 + 0.45 = 0.75
To be a legitimate probabilistic model P must satisfy equation (E3) relating to the attack relation of Figure 4 . Namely we must have
Figure 5: Figure 2 of "A probabilistic semantics for abstract argumentation" [13] .
Let us calculate the P in the right hand side of the above equations. We see that P (a 3 ) = 0.3 = P (¬a 2 ∧ ¬a 5 ) = 0.45.
Therefore this distribution P is not legitimate according to our Method 2. It does not satisfy equations (E3) because P (a 3 ) = P (¬a 2 ∧ ¬a 5 ) Therefore Lemma 3.1 does not apply and indeed, condition (2) of Lemma 3.1 does not hold for a 3 . We have P (a 3 ) = 0.3 but 1 − P (a 2 ) − P (a 5 ) = 0.35. Figure 5 . This is also taken from Thimm's paper [13, Figure 2 ]. It shall be used later to compare our methods with Thimm's.
Example 3.4 Let us look at
1. We use Method 2. Consider the following probability distribution on models
In this model we get P (a 1 ) = 0.5
Let us check whether this probability distribution satisfies equation (E3), namely
We need to have
Thus we have a legitimate model.
We use Method 1.
Let us use Eq inv on this figure, namely we try and solve the equations
Let us use a parameter 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and let
The probabilities we get with parameter x as well as for x = 0.5 are given below. a b Figure 6 : Network for Example 3.5.
If we choose x = 0.5 we get P (a 1 ) = P (a 2 ) = 0.5 and P (a 3 ) = Example 3.5 This example shows that the converse of Lemma 3.1 does not hold. Consider the network in Figure 6 . Any legitimate probability assigned to models would be required to satisfy the following P (a) = P (¬a ∧ ¬b)
Case 1. Try the following probability P 1 .
Therefore P 1 (a) = 0.5
Note that we also have
Similarly for P 1 (b) by symmetry. Also
Thus the conditions of the conclusions of Lemma 3.1 hold. However the assumptions of Lemma 3.1 do not hold, because
Case 2. Let us check whether we can find a probability P 2 which is indeed acceptable to Method 2. Let us try with variables y, z and create equations and solve them:
Therefore P 2 (b) = y + z.
and what is left is
but we must also have
and hence we must have
So we get the equation
Since 0 ≤ y, z ≤ 1 so z must be less than 1 3 . Let us choose z = 0.2 and so y = 0.2. We get, for example
We could also have chosen z = 1 3 and y = 0. This would give P 3 , where
So we get
Example 3.6 Consider the network of Figure 2 . Let us try to find a probabilistic semantics for it according to Method 2. Assume we have
We need to satisfy P (a) = P (¬a ∧ ¬b)
This means we need to solve the following equations.
1.
By adding x 1 + x 2 to both sides (1) can be written as
and by swapping x 3 to the right and −x 1 − x 2 to the left (2) can be written as
Thus we get
Therefore x 2 = 0. There remains, therefore
We can choose values for x 3 .
Sample choice 1.
This yields P (a) = 0, P (b) = 1. This is also the Eq inv solution to
Sample choice 2.
. So x 1 = 1 4 and the probabilities are
. P 2 is a Method 2 probability, which cannot be given by Method 1.
Sample choice 3. x 3 = 0. Then x 1 = 1 2 . We get
Lemma 3.7 Let S, R be a network and let P be a semantic probability (Method 2) for S, R . Let x ∈ S and let {y i } = Att(x). Then 1. If for some y i , P (y i ) = 1 then P (x) = 0.
2. If for all y i , P (y i ) = 0 then P (x) = 1.
Proof. Let us use Figure 1 where
Case 1. Assume that P (y 1 ) = 1. We need to show that P (x) = 0. We have:
We also have
Therefore we have
From (i) and (ii) we get that P (x) = 0.
Case 2. We assume that for all i, P (y i ) = 0 and we need to show that P (x) = 1. We have P (x) = P ( ¬y i ) We also have
Suppose for some ε such that ε y i we have P (ε ) > 0. But ε y i implies ε y i , for some i. Say i = 1. Thus we have ε y 1 and P (y 1 ) = 0 and P (ε ) > 0. This is impossible since
Therefore for all ε such that ε y i we have that P (ε) = 0. Therefore by (iii) and (iv) we get P (x) = 1.
Remark 3.8 Let S, R be a network and let P be a semantic probability for S, R (Method 2). Let λ be defined as follows, for x ∈ S.
The perceptive reader might expect us to say that λ is a legitimate Caminada labelling, especially in view of Lemma 3.7. This is not the case as Example 3.9 shows.
Example 3.9 This example shows that in the probabilistic semantics it is possible to have P (x) = 0, while for all attackers y of x we have 0 < P (y) < 1. Thus the nature of the probabilistic attack is different from the traditional Dung one. If Att(x) is the set of all attackers of x and P ( y∈Att(x) y) = 1, then, and only then P (x) = 0.
Thus the attackers of x can attack with joint probability. The example we give is the network of Figure 7 . This has a Method 1 probability of P 1 (a) = Thus for any model m = ±a ∧ ±b ∧ x we have
and for any model m = ±a ∧ ± ∧ ¬x
Figure 7 also has a Method 2 probability model. We can have
Let us check what values to give to the models. The models are:
We want the following equations to be satisfied.
1. P 2 (x) = 0. This means we need to let
. This means we need to let
, yields the equations
4. We also need to have the equation
We thus have the following equations left
Note that the equations (E3) hold for P 1 and P 2 :
hold of both P 1 and P 2 . As for P (x) = P (¬a ∧ ¬b) we check
So P 1 and P 2 are legitimate probabilities on Figure 7 . P 1 is a Method 1 probability and P 2 is a Method 2 probability. Definition 3.10 We now define the Gabbay-Rodrigues Probabilistic Labelling Π on a network S, R . Π is a {in, out, und}-labelling satisfying the following.
There exists a semantic probability P on S, R such that for all x ∈ S Figure 7 and its mirror image. We saw that in Figure  7 (as well as in this Figure 8 ) any probability on the figures must yield This is not possible because we must have
So P (x 1 ) must be equal to P (x 2 ). This example will show in the comparison with the literature section that our probability semantics is different from that of M. Thimm in [13] .
See also Example 3.5.
Theorem 3.12 Let S, R be a network and let λ be a legitimate Caminada labelling on S, giving rise to a complete extension. Then there exists a probability P λ on the models (Method 2 probabilistic semantics) such that for all x ∈ S:
(We use an idea from M. Thimm [13] ) Let S = {s 1 , . . . , s k }. Then when we regard the elements of S as atomic propositions in classical propositional logic, there are 2 k models based on S. Each of these models gives values 0 (false) or 1 (true) to each atomic proposition. Each such a model can be represented by a conjunction of the form α = i ±s i . α represents the model which gives value 1 to s i if +s i appears in α and gives value 0 to s i if −s i appears in α. Given a model we can construct the respective α for it. Let We now define a Method 2 probability P λ on the models.
3. P λ (m) = 0, for any other model, m different from the above.
Clearly P λ is a probability. We examine its properties (i) Let x be such that λ(x) = in.
Only (1) and (2) can contribute to P λ (x), so the value is 1.
(ii) Let λ(x) = out.
The only two models that can contribute to P λ (x) are in (1) and (2) above, but they prove ¬x. So P λ (x) = 0.
(iii) Let P λ (x) = und.
Then clearly P λ (x) gets a contribution from (1) only. We get P λ (x) = 1 2 . We now need to verify that P λ actually satisfies the equations of (E3). Let x ∈ S and let y i be its attackers. We want to show that
(iv) Assume P λ (x) = 1. Then P λ (x) gets contributions from both (1) and (2) . The only option is that then λ(x) = in, and so all attackers of y i of x are out, so α 0 ¬y i and so P λ ( i ¬y i ) = 1, because it gets contributions from both (1) and (2).
(v) Assume P λ (x) = 0.
Thus neither (1) nor (2) contribute to P λ (x). Therefore α 0 x and so λ(x) = out and so for some attacker y i , λ(y i ) = in and so α 1 y i and so P λ ( i ¬y i ) cannot get any contribution either from (1) or from (2) and so P λ ( i ¬y i ) = 0.
(vi) Assume that P λ (x) = 1 2 . So P λ (x) can get a contribution either from (1) or from (2), but not from both. So λ(x) must be undecided.
So the attackers y i of x are either out (with P λ (y i ) = 0)) or und (with P λ (y i ) = The only model which can both contribute to P λ (e) is α 1 ∧ α 0 ∧ β 1 2 and thus P λ (e) = 1 2 . Thus from (iv), (v) and (vi) we get that (E3) holds for P λ .
Remark 3.13 Note that the P λ of Theorem 3.12 is strictly Method 2 probability. For example we saw that the network of Figure 2 .3 with a = b = und cannot solve Method 1 probability. The next section will see how far we can go with Method 1 probability.
Summary of the results so far for the semantical probabilistic Method 2. We saw that Dung's traditional complete extensions strictly contain the probabilistic Method 1 extensions and is strictly contained in the probabilistic Method 2 extensions.
4 Approximating the semantic probability by syntactic probability
We have seen in Theorem 3.12 that the Method 2 probabilistic semantics can give us all the traditional Dung complete extensions. This result, together with the probabilistic semantics P 2 of Example 3.9 would show that Method 2 semantics is stronger than traditional Dung complete extensions semantics. This section examines how far we can stretch the applicability of the syntactical probability approach (Method 1). We know from the "all-undecided" extension for the network in Figure 2 that there are cases where we cannot give Method 1 probability. We ask in this section, can we approximate such extensions by Method 1 probabilities?
We find that the answer is yes. Let S, R be a network. Let λ be a legitimate Caminada labelling giving rise to a complete extension E = E λ . If the extension is a preferred extension, then there exists a solution f to the Eq inv equations which yield λ and f is actually a Method 1 (and here also a Method 2) probabilistic semantics for S, R . The question remains as to what happens in the case where λ is not a preferred extension. In this case we are not sure whether λ can be realised by a solution f of the Eq inv equations. In fact there are examples of networks where no such f exists. We know from Theorem 3.12 that there exists a probability function P λ on models that would yield λ according to Definition 3.10. We seek an Eq inv function which approximates this probability.
We shall use the ideas of Example 2.5. Figure 9 , which we shall call U n . n = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
Consider

The Eq inv equations solve for this figure as
Thus if u attacks any node x, its "impact" on x is the multiplicative value 1 − 1 2 n . For n very large, the attack is almost negligible. 2. Let S, R be any network. Let u be a node not in S. If we add u to S and let it attack all elements of S, we can assume in view of (1) above that the Eq inv value of u is 1 2 n . Figure 10 depicts this scenario. We suppress {u 1 , . . . , u n } and just record that u = 1 2 n . Construction 4.2 Let S, R be given and let λ be a legitimate Caminada labelling giving rise to a non-preferred extension.
Let u ∈ S be a new point and assume in view of Remark 4.1 that the value of u is very very small. Let S = S ∪ {u} and let
Let λ = λ ∪ {(u, und)}. Let Att(x) be the set of all attackers of x in S, R and let Att (x) be the set of all attackers of x in S , R .
We have if λ (x) ∈ {in, out}, then u ∈ Att (x). If λ (x) = und, then y ∈ Att (u).
Consider the following set of equations on S , R .
This set of equations has a solution f. We claim the following
It is clear that λ(f )(x) = λ (x), for λ (x) ∈ {in, out}. Does λ(f ) agree with λ on undecided points of λ ? The answer is that it must be so, because λ is a preferred extension. So λ(f ) cannot be an extension with more zeros and ones than λ . We create Figure 12 .
We take the equation
The solution for the equations for c, d and u are
We have to insist on a = 1, b = 0. If we do not insist and write the usual equations
we might get a different solution, e.g.
This not the original λ.
Remark 4.4
This remark motivates and proves the next Theorem 4.5. We need some notation. Let Q be a set of atoms. By the models of Q (based on Q) we mean all conjunction normal forms of atoms from Q or their negations. So, for example, if Q = {a, b, c}, we get 8 models, namely
If we have atoms
where Q i are pairwise disjoint we can write the models of
where α is a model of Q 1 , β of Q 2 and γ of Q 3 . For example
Now let S, R and λ be as in Construction 4.2. Remember we assume that the value of u is very very small, and so the attack value (1 − u) is very close to 1. Consider λ and f and λ(f ) again as in Construction 4.2. f is a solution of Eq inv equations (EQ1), (EQ0) and (EQU). Therefore any model of S , say α = ±s 1 ∧±s 2 ∧± . . .∧±s k ∧±u where S = {s 1 , . . . , s k } will have its probability semantics as
where
In particular, we have the following:
We therefore have that any model δ of S has the form
where α is a model of E + ∪ E − and β is a model of E und .
Let α 1,0 be the particular conjunction
Let β be any model of E und . Consider P f (δ), δ = α ∧ β ∧ ±u. Then by (*) we have that
Since P f is a probability, we have for any s ∈ S P f (s) = P f ( y∈Att (s) ¬y).
Note that for s ∈ S, s = u such that λ(s) ∈ {in, out}, u does not attack s, and so we have
For u we have that u is very small and so P f (u) = 1 2 n . For s ∈ S such that λ(s) = und, we have that u attacks s and so
We ask what are the attackers of s ∈ E und ? They cannot be nodes x such that λ(x) = in, because then s would be out. So the value of f (y), (for y ∈ Att(s)) is either 0 or a value in (0, 1).
So we can continue and write
Note that 0 < P f (s) < 1, because all the f (y), for λ(y) = und, satisfy 0 < f (y) < 1.
We also have all models m P f (m) = 1.
Since(**) holds, we need consider only models m of the form α 1,0 ∧ β ∧ ±u. We can write
where β is a model of E und . Let us analyse ( 5) a bit more.
We thus get that:
( 7) says something very interesting. It says that f restricted to E und gives a proper probability distribution on the models of E und .
This combined with ( 3) gives us the following result.
Consider (E und , R und ) where R und = R E und . Then f E und is a proper probability distribution on (E und , R und ).
Does it satisfy the proper equations? Let s ∈ E und . Do we have
Let us check. The real equation is
Since u is very small, we have a very good approximation.
5
We can now define a probability P on S, R . Let m = α ∧ β be a model, where α is a model for E + ∪ E − and β is a model for E und . Then define P as follows
We need to show that approximately
¬y)
If s ∈ E + ∪ E − this follows from ( 1). If s ∈ E und , this follows from ( 3) and ( 8) . Note that since the f involved came from Eq inv equations, P satisfies the following on S, R . P (s) = 0, if some y ∈ Att(s)P (y) = 1 P (s) = 1, if for all y ∈ Att(s), P (y) = 0 P (s) = undecided, otherwise.
( 9)
Theorem 4.5 5 The perceptive reader might ask what happens if we let u converge to 0? The answer is that we get a proper Eq inv extension. However, this may be an all undecided extension (which is what we do want), or it may be a complete extension properly containing all the undecided extensions (which is not what we want!).
We may decide to do what physicists do to their equations. Write the equations in full and simply neglect any item containing higher order u, i.e., u 2 , u 3 , etc. This is reasonable when the value of each node is small.
1. Let S, R be a network and let λ be a legitimate Caminada labelling on S. Then there exists a Method 1 probability distribution P λ , which almost satisfies equation (E3), namely for every ε, there exists a Method 1 probability P λ depending on ε, such that for every x and its attackers y i , we have |P λ (x) − P λ (∧¬y i )| < ε, such that
2. P is obtained as follows Case 1. λ is a preferred extension. Then let f be a solution of Eq inv for S, R . Let
Case 2. λ is not a preferred extension.
Let E λ und = {x|λ(x) = und}. Consider S , R , where S = E λ und ∪ {u}, where u is a new point not in S with value almost 0.
Then S , R has only one extension (all undecided). Let f be a solution to Eq inv on S , R . We now define P λ on S, R .
Let α 1,0 = λ(x)= in x ∧ λ(y)= out ¬y.
Let m = α∧β be an arbitrary model of S, where α is a model of {x|λ(x) ∈ {in, out} and β is a model of E λ und . Define P λ (α ∧ β) to be
where β = s∈E λ und ±s and f (β) = Π ±s in β f (±s). 1. Consider the network of Figure 11 and the extension λ mentioned there,
Following our algorithms we look at the {c, d, u} part of Figure 12 and solve the equations. We get u = . The probability P λ will be as follows: 
Now look at
2. Let us look at Figure 13 .
The {c, d} part is Figure 2 . Here we solve the equations on the {c, d, u} part associated with {c, d}, which is the same as Figure 3 . The solution is found in Example 2.5, with u = We now discuss imposing probability on instantiated networks such as AS-PIC+. We begin with simple instantiations into classical propositional logic. Definition 4.7
1. An abstract instantiated network (into classical propositional logic) has the form A = S, R, I , where S, R is an abstract argumentation network and I is a mapping associating with each x ∈ S, a well-formed formula I(x) = ϕ x of classical propositional logic.
2. For any A as in 1, we associate the theory ∆ A = {ϕ x ↔ ∧ (y,x)∈R ¬ϕ y | x ∈ S}.
3. A semantic probability model P on A is a probability distribution on the models based on S such that for all x ∈ S, we have:
Example 4.8 Consider Figure 14 where part (b) is an instatiation of part (a) with I(x) = a 1 ∨ a 2 and I(a 3 ) = a 3 . The equations any probability assignment needs to satisfy are
If we let P (a 1 ) = x, P (a 2 ) = 1 − x, P (a 3 ) = 0, with x ∈ [0, 1], then P satisfies the equations. Compare with Example 3.4. 
Comparison with the literature
There are several probabilistic argumentation papers around. This is a hot topic in 2014. We highlight two main points of view. The external and the internal views. Let S, R be a network and let f be a function from S to [0, 1]. We can regard f as giving a probability number to each x ∈ S. The internal probability is where the above numbers signify the value of the argument. Its truth, its reliability, its probability of being effective, etc., or whatever measure we attach to it as an argument. Figure 15 represents in this case the Eq inv solution (and hence probability) of the network of Figures 2 and 3 . The external view is to think of f (x) as the probability of the predicate "x ∈ S". That is, the probability that the argument x is present in S. Consider again Figure 15 .
The probability that a is in the network is 0.236 and the probability that b is in the network is 0.382. Therefore, the probability that the network contains Figure 15: The Eq inv solution to the networks of Figures 2 and 3 both {a, b} is 0.236 × 0.388 = 0.09. The probability that the network contains only a is 0.236×(1−0.382) = 0.1458. The probability that the network contains only b is 0.382 × (1 − 0.236) = 0.292 and the probability that the network is empty is (1 − 0.236) × (1 − 0.382) = 0.472. It is clear why we are calling this view an external probability view. It imposes probability externally expressing uncertainty on what the network graph is. This is done either by giving the probability to points or more generally by giving probability directly to subsets G of S, expressing the probability that the graph is really that subset of S with R restricted to G. This external view has value in dialogue argumentation or negotiation when we try to estimate what network our opponent is reasoning with. The problem with this external view is how to connect with the attack relation. Note that mathematically in the external view we have probabilities on points in S or probabilities on subsets of S, which are the same options as in our internal view, but the understanding of them is different. We in the internal view considered the subset as a classical model, while the external view considers it as a subnetwork. When we use the internal view, we can connect it with the attack relation via the equational approach (Equation (E3)), but how would the external view connect with the attack relation? We can ask, for example, how to get a value for a single point to be "in" an extension? Intuitively, looking back at Figure 15 , we can say the point a for example is "in" in case the network is {a} and is also "in" in one of the three extensions in case the network is {a, b}. So we might take the "in" value to be 0.1458 + 0.09/3 = 0.1458 + 0.03 = 0.1758. The connection with the attack relation can be done perhaps through the probabilities for admissible sets, since being admissible is connected with the attack relation. There are problems, however, with this approach.
Hunter [7] was trying to lay some foundations for this view, following the papers [3, 9] . See also a good summary in Hunter [8] . Hunter was trying to find a connection between the external probability view and some reasonable values we can give to admissible subsets. He proposes restrictions on the probability function on S. We are not going to discuss or reproduce Hunter's arguments here. It suffices to say that possibly a subsequent paper of ours will critically examine the external view and compare with the internal view.
Let us now compare our work with that of M. Thimm, [13] , whose approach is also internal. We quote from [13] :
"In this paper we use another interpretation for probability, that of subjective probability [11] . There, a probability P (X) for some X ∈ X denotes the degree of belief we put into X. Then a probability function P can be seen as an epistemic state of some agent that has uncertain beliefs with respect to X . In probabilistic reasoning [11, 12] , this interpretation of probability is widely used to model uncertain knowledge representation and reasoning.
In the following, we consider probability functions on sets of arguments of an abstract argumentation frameworks. Let AF = (Arg, →) be some fixed abstract argumentation framework and let E = 2
Arg be the set of all sets of arguments. Let now P AF be the set of probability functions of the form P : 2 ε → [0, 1]. A probability function P ∈ P AF assigns to each set of possible extensions of AF a probability, i.e. P (e) for e ∈ E is the probability that e is an extension and P (E) for E ⊆ E is the probability that any of the sets in E is an extension. In particular, note the difference between e.g. P ({A, B}) = P ({{A, B}}) and P ({{A}, {B}}) for arguments A, B. While the former denotes the probability that {A, B} is an extension the latter denotes the probability that {A} or {B} is an extension. In general, it holds P ({A, B}) = P ({{A}, {B}}) .
For P ∈ P AF and A ∈ Arg we abbreviate
Given some probability function P , the probability P (A) represents the degree of belief that A is in an extension (according to P ), i.e. P (A) is the sum of the probabilities of all possible extensions that contain A. The set P AF contains all possible views one can take on the arguments of an abstract argumentation framework AF. Example 4. We continue Ex. 1. (Comment by Gabbay and Rodrigues: This is the network of our Figure 4 .) Consider the function P ∈ P AF defined via P ({A 1 , A 3 , A 5 }) = 03, P ({A 1 , A 4 }) = 0.45, P ({A 5 , A 2 }) = 0.1, P ({A 2 , A 4 }) = 0.15, and P (3) = 0 for all remaining e ∈ E. Due to Prop. 1 the function P is well-defined as in, e.g.,
Therefore, P is a probability function according to Def. 3. According to P the probabilities to reach argument of AF compute to P (A 1 ) = 0.75, P (A 2 ) = 0.25, P (A 3 = 0.3, P (A 4 ) = 0.6, and P (A 5 ) = 0.4. In the following, we are only interested in those probability functions of P AF that agree with our intuition on the interrelationships of arguments and attack. For example, if an argument A is not attacked we should completely believe in its validity if no further information is available. We propose the following notion of justifiability to describe this intuition. Definition 4. A probability function P ∈ P AF is called p-justifiable wrt. AF, denoted by P J AF, if it satisfies for all A ∈ Arg.
1. P (A) ≤ 1 − P (B) for all B, ∈ Arg with B → A and 2. P (A) ≥ 1 − B∈F P (B) where F = {B|B → A}.
Let P J AF be the set of all p-justifiable probability functions wrt. AF. The notion of p-justifiability generalizes the concept of complete semantics to the probabilistic setting. Property 1.) says that the degree of belief we assign to an argument A is bounded from above by the complement to 1 of the degrees of belief we put into the attackers of A. As a special case, note that if we completely believe in an attacker of A, i.e., P (B) = 1 for some B with B → A, then it follows P (A) = 0. This corresponds to property 1.) of a complete labelling (see Section 2). Property 2.) of Def. 4 says that the degree of belief we assign to an argument A is bounded from below by the inverse of the sum of the degrees of belief we put into the attacks of A. As a special case, note that if we completely disbelieve in all attackers of A, i.e. P (B) = 0 for all B with B → A, then it follows P (A) = 1. This corresponds to property 2.) of a complete labeling, see Section 2. The following proposition establishes the probabilistic analogue of the third property of a complete labelling. Proposition 2. Let P be p-justifiable and A ∈ Arg. If P (A) ∈ (0, 1) then 1. there is no B ∈ Arg with B → A and P (B) = 1 and 2. there is a B ∈ Arg with B → A and P (B ) > 0.
From our point of view, Thimm's approach is a variant of our semantic Method 2 approach without the strong equation (E3) but the weaker Definition 4 of Thimm. Thus Thimm will allow for different values for nodes x 1 and x 2 in our Figure 8 , while we would not (see Example 3.5).
Although Thimm's approach is mathematically close to us, conceptually we are far apart. Thimm motivates his approach as a degree of belief in a subset E ⊆ S, considering E as an extension. We consider E as representing a classical model m of the classical propositional logic with atoms S m = s∈E s ∧ s ∈E ¬s and assign probability to it and then we export this probability to argumentation via the equational approach, equation (E3). This is an instance of our methodology of "Logic by Translation", From our point of view, equations (E3) are essential, conceptual and non-technical. For Thimm, the inequalities of his Definition 4 appear to be technical to enable the probabilities to work of ground extension.
Our point of view also leads us to the Eq inv Method 1 probabilities and to the approximation results of Section 4.
In Thimm's conceptual approach, this way of thinking does not even arise. To summarise, this paper presented an internal view of probabilistic argumentation. There is a need for two subsequent research papers 1. The external view done coherently and its connection to the internal view 2. A conditional probability view and its connection with Bayesian Networks views as Argumentation Networks
Conclusions
This section explains and sets our approach in a general generic context. Suppose we are given a system S such as an argumentation system S, R and we want to add to it some aspect A.
There is a generic way to add any new feature to a system. It involves 1) identifying the basic units which build up the system and 2) introducing the new feature to each of these basic units. In the case where the system is argumentation and the feature is probabilistic we have the following: the basic units are a. the nature of the arguments involved; b. the membership relation in the set S of arguments; 6 c. the attack relation; and d. the choice of extensions.
Generically to add a new aspect (probabilistic, or fuzzy, or temporal, etc) to an argumentation network S, R can be done by adding this feature to each component. a. We make the effective strength of the argument probabilistic; b. we give probability to whether an argument is included in S; 7 c. we make the attack relation probabilistic; and d. we put probability on the extensions.
These features interact and need to be chosen with care and coordination. We need a methodological approach to make our choices. One such methodology is what we called logic by translation.
We meaningfully translate the argumentation system into classical logic which does have probabilistic models and then let probabilistic classical logic endow the probability on the argumentation system. As we mentioned, this of course depends on how we translate.
We gave in this paper an object-level translation. The arguments of S became atoms of classical propositional logic, we then used probability on the models of classical logic and used the attack relation R to express equational restrictions on the probabilities. In this kind of translation, the attack relation did not become probabilistic.
We could have used a meta-level translation into classical predicate logic, using a binary relation R for expressing in classical logic the attack relation and using unary predicates to express that an argument x is "in", x is "out", etc., with suitable coordinating axioms. In this case all predicates would have become probabilistic including the attack relation R. As far as we know nobody has done this to R.
In this context of possible options what we have done is one systematic approach and we compared it with other approaches. It should be noted that we could have followed the same steps to get fuzzy argumentation networks; temporal argumentation networks; or indeed any other feature available for classical propositional logic.
